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Is paragraph 4.18.1 of the contract between Okland and

Little America violative of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §138-1 under the circumstances and thus void and unenforceable?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
[N]o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law; nor deny
to any person in its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Utah Const, art. I § 2.
All political power is inherent in the people
and all free governments are founded on their
authority for their equal protection and
benefit, and they have the right to alter or
reform their government as the public welfare
may require.
Utah Const, art. 1 § 11.
All courts shall be open, and every person for
any injury done to him in his person, property
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law, which shall be administered without
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any trial in this State, by himself or
counsel, in any civil cause to which he is a
party.

2

Section 78-12-25.5 Utah Code Ann. (i^oJ, as amended)
Injury due to defective design or construction of improvement
to real property - within seven years
An action to recover damages for any
i njury to property, real or personal
or for any injury to the person, or
for bodily injury or wrongful death,
arising out of the defective and
unsafe condition of any improvement
to real property, or any action for
damages sustained on account of the
injury, may not be brought against
any person performing or furnishing
the design, planning, surveying,
supervising the construction of, or
constructing the improvement to real
property more than seven years after:
the completion of construction.

The ,. * .,.*.
Lamon imposed by thi s
section does not apply to any person in
actual possession and control as owner,
tenant or otherwise of the improvement at
the time the defective
and
unsafe
condition of the improvement constitutes
the proximate cause of the injury for
which an action is brought.
This section does not extend or limit the
period otherwise prescribed by state law
for the bringing of any action,
As; used in this section;
(, i j Person
meaiis
,..
corporation, partnership
legal entity.
(b)

lf

individual
or other

Completion of construction" leans
the
date
f: issuance
• - the
certificate of substantial completion
by the owner, architect, engineer or

other agent or the date of the owner's use
of possession of the improvement on real
property.
Section 13-8-1 Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended)
Construction industry - Agreements to indemnify.
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding
in, or in connection with or collateral to, a
contract
or agreement
relative to the
construction, alteration, repair or maintenance
of a building, structure, highway, appurtenance
and appliance, including moving, demolition and
excavating connected therewith, purporting to
indemnify the promisee against liability for
damages arising out of bodily injury to persons
or damage to property caused by or resulting
from the sole negligence of the promisee, his
agents or employees, or indemnitee, is against
public policy and is void and unenforceable.
This act will not be construed to affect or
impair the obligations of contracts or
agreements, which are in existence at the time
the act becomes effective.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is a consolidation of two appeals from the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable
David S. Young presiding.
David
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The first appeal was taken from Judge
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defendants Martin Stern Jr. & Associates, Okland Construction Co.,
Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. and Higham-Hilton Mechanical
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 4, 198<# „ James Sanchez \
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and

It,'. I'tl'H 1 Hi ii 1 L would be a good idea to try and

5

cool off, so he went to the pool, dived in and struck his head.
Deposition of James Sanchez, dated 11/21/87 at 3 5 (hereinafter
"Sanchez Depo.")
Mr. Sanchez had been swimming in the same pool earlier in the
day and had exited the pool at that time just a few feet from where
he dived in at the time that he injured himself.

He recalls that

when he got out of the pool earlier in the day he noticed that the
pool depth marks in the area indicated that the water was five feet
deep.

Sanchez Depo. at 45-48.

Sanchez filed an action against Little America on January 14,
1987 for the injuries he sustained.

(R. 2 - 18) .

On or about

November 16, 1987, Sanchez filed an amended complaint, naming
Okland, among others, as an additional party.

(R. 51-82, 89-90).

The construction of the Little America Hotel pool and sauna
were substantially complete, and Little America took possession of
the same by November 15, 1978, with more than seven years passing
between the date of substantial completion and the time of the
accident.

(R. 224-225).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

As set forth in Argument I, this Court has already determined
that Utah Code Ann., §78-12-25.5 is constitutional based upon a
prior challenge

that the statute violated

the

"open courts11

provision of the Utah Constitution, as well as the equal protection
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ARGUMENT I
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-25.5 IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND
SHOULD BE ENFORCED AS WRITTEN.
A. The Court should not disturb it prior
pronouncement that Utah Code Ann., §78-12-25.5
is constitutional.
In the case of Good v. Christensen. 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974),
this Court was faced with the identical issue now faced by the
Court, namely, does §78-12-25.5 violate (1) the "equal protection"
guarantees of the United States and Utah Constitutions, and (2) the
"open courts" provisions of the Utah Constitution.

The Good Court

expressly held that the attack on the constitutionality of the
statute was "without merit".

Id. at 225.

Although the Court in

Good did not thoroughly explain its holding, an examination of the
brief submitted by the appellant in the Good case shows that the
statute in that case was challenged on the identical grounds that
have been raised in the present appeal. The statute was challenged
in Good, as set forth in Appellant's Brief:
This is a violation of the due process and equal
protection provisions of the 14th Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, as well as
Sections 2, 7, and 11 of Article 1 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah.
Brief of Appellant, Case No. 13659 at 17-18, Briefs of the Supreme
Court of Utah, Vol. 896.

Copies of both the appellant's and the
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It is one of the important principles in the
structure of our law, i n a well ordered society
it is important that people know what their legal
rights are, not only under constitutions and
legislative enactments, but also as defined by
judicial precedent, and having conducted their
affairs in reliance thereon, ought not to have
their rights swept away by judici al decree.
Freeman v

Stewart

s I- M i 74, Un
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In a more recent pronouncement, Justice Howe's concurring
opinion in Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co,, 740 P.2d 1281 (Utah
1987) , quoted with approval from several cases discussing the
doctrine of stare decidis, including: "a statutory construction
once made and followed should never be altered upon the changed
views of new personnel."

In re Burtt's Estate, 353 Pa. 217, 44

A.2d 670, 162 A.L.R. 1053 (1945).
It is important to note that the Court's decision in Good,
which upheld the constitutionality of the contractor's statute of
repose,

pre-dated

Okland's

agreement

to

participate

in

the

construction of the Little America project. Accordingly, under the
principles and rationales supporting the doctrine of stare decisis,
Okland

was

therefore

entitled

to

assume

that

its potential

liability on the project was totally extinguished once the project
had been completed for a period of seven years.
In it's appellant's brief, Little America cited to the Malan
v. Lewis decision in support of the proposition that "a ruling that
a statute is constitutional does not thereafter become immune from
reconsideration".

See, Appellant's Brief of Little America Hotel,

Inc. at 36, (quoting, Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 668-669 (Utah
1984)).

However, Little America's brief fails to quote the entire

sentence from the Malan decision.
states:
10

That sentence in its entirety

But a ruling that a statute is constitutional does
not thereafter become immune from reconsideration
when other laws have been enacted or new factual
circumstances arise that alter the premises upon
which the challenged statute was based.
Id, at 668-669 (emphasis added)•
In the past fifteen years since this Court declared that Utah
Code Ann., §78-12-25.5 was constitutional in the Good decision,
there

have

been

circumstances

no

have

new

laws

enacted

and

arose

which

should

cause

reconsider its previous decision.

no

new

this

factual
Court

to

Therefore, the Good Court's

decision with regard to the constitutionality Utah Code Ann.,§7812-25.5

should

stand,

and the appellants' appeals should be

dismissed.
B. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 clearly
does not violate either "open court" or
"equal protection" provisions of the
United States and Utah Constitutions.
a.

"Open Court" Analysis

At the outset it should be noted that statutes are endowed
with a strong presumption of validity and they should not be
declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis upon
which

they

framework.

can

be

found

to

come within

the

constitutional

Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983).
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In the case of Berrv v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 760 (Utah
1985), this Court established a two-part test for determining
whether or not a statute violated Utah Constitution Art. I, §11.
First,
Section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured
person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy
"by due course of law" for vindication of his
constitutional interest.
and second,
If there is no substitute or alternative remedy
provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action
may be justified only if there is a clear social or
economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of
an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or
unreasonable means for achieving the objective.
Id. at 680.
Mr. Sanchez does have an adequate alternative remedy and
therefore the architect's and builder's statute of repose meets the
first part of the Berry test. As was stated earlier in this brief,
the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 was previously
upheld

in the Good

decision.

Good.

527 P. 2d at

225.

In

distinguishing the builder's statute of repose from the products
liability statute of repose, the Berry Court noted that the Good
Court had "observed that a person injured by a defect in a building
would still have a remedy against an owner of the building and
perhaps others."

Berry, 717 P.2d at 683.
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Section 78-12-25.5 specifically provides that:
The limitation imposed by his provision shall not
apply to any person in actual possession and control
as owner, tenant or otherwise . . . at the time . . .
of the injury . . . .
Utah Code Ann., §78-12-25.5 (1967).

The Good Court interpreted

this language to mean that the statute "allows others to sue him
[the owner] for his torts, if any, within the regular statute of
limitation after the cause accrues."

Good. 527 P.2d at 225.

A landowner such as Little America has a duty towards its
business invitees, such as Mr. Sanchez, to inspect and maintain its
premises in a reasonably safe condition or to warn the visitor of
any dangerous conditions existing thereon.

Stevens v. Colorado

Fuel & Iron, 469 P.2d 3 (Utah 1970); Roaalski v. Phillips Petroleum
Company. 282 P.2d 304 (Utah 1955).

Thus, Mr. Sanchez may proceed

to seek recovery from Little America, if Little America breached
a duty which it owed to him.

Mr. Sanchez also contends that the

manufacturer of the sauna manufactured a defective product.

The

builder's statute of repose would not bar recovery in a products
liability action.
Other Courts, when confronted with an "open courts" challenge
to their state's builder's statute of repose have found that since
alternative remedies exist the statute is constitutional.
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Reeves

v, Ille Electric Co, . 551 P.2d 647, 652 (Mont. 1976), Walsh v.
Gowing, 494 A.2d 543, 548 (R.I. 1985).
Because the first prong of the Berry two-part test is met,
there is no need to proceed to the second prong.

However, Utah

Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 also meets the requirements of the second
test.

An examination of the reasons that other courts have given

in upholding their builder's statutes of repose against "open
court" provision challenges is helpful.
The statute

of repose

is needed

to eliminate perpetual

liability on the part of builders and architects. Yarbro v. Hilton
Hotels Corp.. 655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1983); Klein v. Catalano. 437
N.E. 2d 520 (Mass. 1982).
Builders and Architects have no control over the building once
the owner takes possession

of it.

Therefore, there

is the

possibility of neglect, poor maintenance, mishandling, improper
modification and improper repair.

See. Barnhouse v. Pinole, 183

Cal. Rptr. 881 (Cal. 1982); Yarbro, 655 P.2d at 826; and Cheswold
Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lambertson Construction, 489 A.2d 413 (Del.
1984) .
Requiring architects and builders to remain potentially liable
as long as the structure remains standing puts an undue burden upon
them in having to defend lawsuits which are brought many years
after the structure was complete.
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After such a long delay, as in this case, the proof
problems in defending a negligence action of this
kind would be very difficult to surmount. For example,
the standards for architectural performance as well as
building codes could have changed significantly in
the intervening years, and it would be difficult to
establish the standard of care of a reasonably
prudent architect at the time the design services
were rendered in the late 1950fs. See, Howell v. Burk,
90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (1977). These problems,
in our view, support the reasonableness of the
legislative action. We are not unmindful of the fact
that these delays also impose proof problems on the
party asserting liability, but nevertheless the
legislature is free to set reasonable restrictions so
long as constitutional requirements are met.
Yarbro, 655 P.2d at 826 fn. 5. It should be noted that the passage
of time has made important facts in this case more difficult to
ascertain.

For instance, in attempting to discover the date when

the Little America project was substantially completed it was
learned that the pertinent records kept by Salt Lake City only go
back as far as 1980. It was further learned that the gentleman who
would have performed the bulk of the inspection on the Little
America project on behalf of Salt Lake City was deceased.

See,

Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment p. 6, Record
at 513.
Congressional studies have shown that the vast majority of all
claims brought

against design and building professionals are

brought within seven years after the construction is complete.
Hearings

on

H.R.

6527,

H.R.

6678,
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and

H.R.

11544

Before

Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the District of
Columbia. 90th Cong., 1st Session 28 (1967), cited in Yarbro. 655
P.2d at 825 fn. 4.
For the foregoing reasons Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 also
meets the requirements of the second prong of the Berry test. The
statute provides a reasonable means for obtaining the proper
objective of prohibiting the potential of perpetual liability
against architects and builders, and therefore is not violative of
Utah Constitution Art. I §11.
Finally, with respect to appellants' open court arguments, it
should be noted that to potentially violate Utah Constitution Art.
I §11# the subject law must seek to eliminate an "existing legal
remedy".

Berry, 717 P.2d at 680.

Therefore, if in 1967, at the

time that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 was enacted, the courts of
this State did not recognize a cause of action by a third-party
against the builder of an alleged defective premises, then the
statute

did

not

eliminate

an existing

remedy

and

cannot be

violative of the open court provisions of the Utah Constitution.
At or about the time that the statute of repose was enacted,
Utah courts adhered to the general rule that a contractor's
liability on a project ended when the owner accepted the work.
See, Leininaer v. Stearns Roger, 404 P.2d 33 (Utah 1965).

The

Leininaer Court discussed the "modern view" wherein some court's
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were extending contractor's liability to cover injuries sustained
by third-persons after the construction was complete.

Id. at 36.

However, the Leininaer Court did not say whether or not it was
adopting the modern view in Utah, and specifically refused to say
whether the contractor at issue in the case could be held liable
to the injured third-party.
Recently

the

Id. at 37.

Connecticut

Supreme

Court

upheld

the

constitutionality of its architect's statute of repose against an
"open court" challenge.
1988) .

Zapata v. Burns. 542 A.2d 700 (Conn.

The Zapata court noted that a cause of action against an

engineer or architect, by a person not in privity with them was a
"relatively recent development in the law". Id. at 710. The court
held that since the cause of action was not recognized at the time
that the state constitution was adopted in 1818, that the statute
did not violate the "open courts" clause of the constitution.

Id.

at 711.
In Utah, not only would Mr. Sanchez not have been able to
bring a successful cause of action against Okland for the relief
that he seeks at the time that our state constitution was adopted,
he would not even have been able to bring the action in 1967 when
the statute of repose was enacted.
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This Court had not yet

recognized the cause of action. Therefore, Utah Code Ann. §78-1225.5 did not abrogate an "existing" cause of action at the time it
was enacted and does not violate Utah Constitution Art. I §11.
b.

Equal Protection Analysis

For purposes of equal protection analysis, because there is
neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right involved, the
court's scrutiny of the statute need only determine whether the
statute bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state
objective. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984); Malan, 693
P.2d at 674 fn. 17; Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels, 655 P.2d 822 (Colo.
1982); and Twin Falls Clinic v. Hamill. 644 P.2d 341 (Idaho 1982).
The appellants argue that the Utah contractor's statute of
repose establishes an unreasonable classification because it does
not include owners and materialmen.

When confronted with an

identical argument surrounding a challenge to its contractor's
statute of repose the Supreme Court of Colorado reasoned that (1)
owners were properly excluded from the statute because of their
"continuing control of the premises and are responsible for repairs
and replacements of damaged or dangerous conditions", and (2)
materialmen were properly excluded from the statute because their
accountability was covered under theories of products liability law
and:

18

Suppliers and manufacturers, who typically supply
and produce components in large quantities, make
standard goods and develop standard processes. They
can thus maintain high quality control standards in
the controlled environment of the factory.
Yarbro, 655 P.2d at 828. The Yarbro court therefore concluded that
the classification was reasonable and that the classification was
reasonably related to the legitimate state objective of limiting
liability for architects, contractors, engineers and inspectors
once their participation in a project is completed.

Id. at 827.

Just as in Yarbro, the reasonable classifications established
by

Utah

Code

Ann.

§78-12-25.5

legitimate state objective.

are

reasonably

related

to a

It was reasonable of the legislature

to specifically exclude owners so as not to relieve them of their
ongoing duties of care towards persons who enter onto their
premises.

Likewise, it was reasonable to exclude materialmen,

whose liability in such cases would be governed under principles
of products liability law.
And, just as in Yarbro. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 serves the
legitimate state objective of eliminating perpetual liability ont
he part of builders and architects.

See, previous argument and

discussion at p. 14 - 16 of this brief.

In addition to the

Colorado Supreme Court, a list of some of those courts who have
upheld contractor's and architect's statutes of repose when faced
with equal protection challenges includes:
19

Twin Falls Clinic &

Hospital Blda. v. Hamill. 644 P.2d 341 (Idaho 1982); Yakima Fruit
and Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating and Plumbing, 503 P.2d 108
(Wash. 1973); Reeves v. Ilie Electric Company, 551 P.2d 647 (Mont.
1976); Barnhouse v. Pinole, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881 (Cal. App. 1982);
Zapata v. Burns. 542 A.2d 700 (Conn. 1988); Burnmaster v. Gravity
Drainage Dist. No. 2. 366 So.2d 1381 (La. 1978); Whiting-Turner
Contracting Co. v. Coupard. 499 A.2d 178 (Md. 1985); Cheswold Vol.
Fire Co. v. Lambertson Construction, 489 A.2d 413 (Del. 1984); and
Beecher v. White. 447 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. App. 1983).
C. Little America's constitutional challenge
based upon "due process" arguments is not properly
before the Court, as it was not raised as an
issue before the court below.
In its appellant's brief, Little America argues that Utah Code
Ann. §78-12-25.5 violates due process guarantees of the United
States and Utah constitutions.

See, Little America's Appellant's

Brief p. 41. However, this is the first time in this action that
a challenge has been raised to the statute based on due process
considerations.

This Court cannot consider matters not in the

record before the trial court for the first time on appeal. Matter
of Estate of Cluff, 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 1978); Reliable Furniture
Company v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc.. 380
P.2d 135 (Utah 1963).
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A review of the record before the court below shows that due
process arguments were not presented to Judge Young for his
consideration in ruling upon the motions for summary judgment at
issue here.

Therefore, Little America's attempt to argue it for

the first time on appeal is inappropriate.
And, in any event, the constitutional challenges presented to
the Court in the Good decision included due process arguments.
See, Addendum "A" p. 17-18. Thus, this Court's holding in the Good
case is also dispositive of due process claims.
It should also be noted that the courts of other states have
consistently upheld the constitutionality of similar statutes of
repose against challenges that the statutes violated due process.
Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp.. 655 P.2d at 826 (Colo. 1982);
Reeves v. Ille Electric Company, 551 P.2d at 652 (Mont. 1976);
Klein v. Catalano. 437 N.E.2d 514 (Mass. 1982); Cheswold Volunteer
Fire Company v. Lambertson Construction Company. 489 A.2d 413 (Del.
1984); Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 183 Cal.Rptr. 881 (Cal.App.
1982), Beecher v. White, 447 N.E.2d 622 (Ind.App. 1983), Elizabeth
Gamble Deaconess Home v. Turner Construction, 470 N.E.2d 950, 957
(Ohio App. 1984).
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ARGUMENT II
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-25.5 AFFORDS OKLAND ULTIMATE
REPOSE FROM ANY AND ALL ACTIONS ARISING OUT OF THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL.
A. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 is a bar to
Little America's crossclaims for contractual
and equitable indemnification against Okland.
This Court has interpreted Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 to mean
that "(i)t prevents the owner as well as all others from suing the
designer, planner, supervisor or contractor after seven years from
completion of the project."

Good, 527 P.2d at 224.

Inspite of

this clear and direct language from the Court, Little America
contends that it may still sue Okland on theories of indemnity.
It is the general rule that "a cause of action for indemnity
does not arise until the liability of the party seeking indemnity
results in damage, either through payment.of a sum clearly owned
or through the injured party's obtaining an enforceable judgment."
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co. . 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah
1984).

However, just two paragraphs further into the opinion, the

Perry Court stated an exception to that general rule:
A specific statutory limitation period that seeks
ultimate repose of causes of action will control
over a general statute of limitations, even to cut
off an indemnity action that technically has not
accrued.
Id. at 218.
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Causes of action for indemnity are cut off by a statute of
repose such as §78-12-25.5 inasmuch as a required element for such
an action is that "the prospective indemnitor [Okland] must also
be liable to the third person [Sanchez]11. Perry, 681 P.2d at 218.
Because the statute of repose cuts off Okland1s liability to
Sanchez, this necessary element of an indemnity action is missing.
Court's of other jurisdictions have held that statutes of
repose cut off all actions for indemnification including those
based on contract.

To prevent "perpetual liability" a builder's

statute of repose was held to cut off claims for express and
implied contractual indemnity, equitable indemnity and comparative
indemnity, when the underlying action was brought beyond the
statute's 10 year limit. Sandy v. Superior Court (Daon Corp.), 247
Cal Rptr. 677 (Cal.App. 1988).

This was held to be so even though

the causes of action for indemnity had not yet accrued.

Id. at

683. See also. Aaus v. Future Chattanooga Development Corporation,
358 F.Supp. 246 (D.C. Tenn. 1973); Nevada Lakeshore Co. v. Diamond
Electric. Inc.. 511 P.2d 113 (Nev. 1973); Beecher v. White. 447
N.E.2d 622 (Ind.App. 1983); and Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v.
Coupard. 499 A.2d 178 (Md. 1988).
Little

America's

reliance

upon

the Valley

Circle case,

discussed at length in its appellant's brief p. 13-15, is misguided

23

in that a correct reading of the case shows that it stands for the
very proposition that Okland now makes for the Court.
We read this language to mean that a crosscomplaint for indemnity may be filed more than
10 years after the alleged indemnitor has
substantially completed his services, provided
that the underlying action was itself brought
within the 10-year limitation period of the
statute.
Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consol, Inc., 659 P.2d 1160 (Cal.
1983). There is no question that the action brought by Mr. Sanchez
and the subsequent crossclaims by Little America were filed after
the seven-year Utah limitation period.

Therefore, the Valley

Circle decision does not help Little America's position, in fact
it is quite detrimental to Little America's position.
Likewise,

Little America's

reliance

on

the

Southeastern

Electric Company case, which was discussed at length in its brief,
is misguided.

In that case the Court was comparing two statutes

of limitation, one for three years and one for six years; the court
was not confronted with a statute of repose and whether or not it
would cut off claims for contractual indemnity.

Insurance Company

of North America v. Southeastern Electric Company, 275 N.W.2d 255
(Mich. 1979).

Also, Little America's discussion of the Wolverine

case is not helpful, because again the Court was not confronted
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with whether an indemnity action was barred by an applicable
statute of repose.

Wolverine Insurance Co. v. Tower Ironworks.

Inc., 370 F.2d 700 (1st Cir. 1966).
To argue, as Little America does, that indemnity actions are
not cut off by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5, but that instead the
six-year statute of limitation for contracts, Utah Code Ann. §7812-23

is

applicable,

is

to

ignore

the

plain

pronouncement of the Perry Court to the contrary*

and

direct

In the Perry

case, which involved the sale of goods, the Court was confronted
with the question as to whether or not the four-year statute of
limitations provided in the Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann.
§70A-2-725, was applicable as opposed to the six-year general
contract statute of limitations Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23.

In

holding that the four-year statute of limitations was applicable,
the Court stated that "(w)hen two statutory provisions appear to
conflict, the more specific provision will govern over the more
general provision."

Perry, 681 P.2d at 216.

In Perry the Court determined that the more "specific" statute
was the one intended to provide "ultimate repose" in transactions
for the sale of goods.

Id. at 219. The Court also reasoned that

the "ultimate repose" intended by the statute barred all actions
brought more than four years after delivery of the goods, including
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actions for indemnity, inspite of the fact that under the general
rule a cause of action for indemnity had not yet accrued.

Id. at

218-219.
In support of its reasoning establishing an exception to the
general rule, it is interesting to note that the Perry Court
referred to and discussed the Nevada Lakeshore Company decision.
Perry, 681 P.2d at 218, citing to: Nevada Lakeshore Company v.
Diamond Electric. Inc.. 511 P.2d 113 (Nev. 1973).
In Nevada Lakeshore the heirs of an individual, who was
electrocuted while swimming in the pool of an apartment complex
brought a wrongful death action against the owner and operator of
the pool. The owner of the pool then brought a third-party action
seeking indemnity from the designer and installer of the electrical
system for the pool.

The trial court granted the third-party

defendant's motion for summary judgment holding that since the pool
had been substantially complete more than ten years prior to the
filing of the action for wrongful death, that the third-party
action for indemnification was barred by Nevada's six year statute
of repose.
On

Id. at 114.

appeal

the trial

court's ruling was affirmed.

The

appellate court reasoned that the purpose of the statue of repose
was to offer protection from liability to the persons engaged in
designing, planning and construction of improvements,, who would
26

otherwise fact potential liability for many years.
further

reasoned

that

it would

"thwart

the

The court

purpose

of the

enactment" to require a party to remain in an action under an
indemnity theory, when it was the purpose of the statute to afford
"ultimate repose".

Nevada Lakeshore. 511 P.2d at 114.

This Court should follow its reasoning as set forth in both
the Perry case and in the Nevada Lakeshore case to which the Perry
cited to with approval, and hold that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5
is a bar to all claims brought more than seven years after the
completion of construction, including claims for indemnification.
Absent such a holding the statute will not provide the "ultimate
repose" from the threat of potential liability that it was intended
to provide.
B. The contractual indemnification language
is void and unenforceable because it
violates the provisions of Utah Code Ann
§13-8-1.
As has been stated earlier in this brief, this Court has
previously construed Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 to mean that an
owner of premises can still be held liable to an injured thirdperson

for the owner's own torts.

Good,

527 P.2d

at 224.

Therefore, if Mr. Sanchez is to prevail against Little America it
will be as a result of a finding that Little America committed
tortious conduct after it took possession of the premises.
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If

Little America interprets the indemnification provisions of the
contract between them to include the requirement that Okland must
indemnify Little America for Little America's torts committed after
completion of the construction, then the subject indemnity clause
violates the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §13-8-1.
If the language of an indemnification clause purports to
provide indemnification for the prospective indemnitee's (Little
America's) own negligence, but the clause fails to limit the
obligation to situations where the prospective indemnitee is not
the

sole

responsible

party,

then

"such

an

all

encompassing

indemnification provision is against public policy and is void and
unenforceable" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §13-8-1.
Kennecott Corp., 663 F.Supp. 268 (D.Utah 1987).

Wollam v.

The Wollam court

held that when a indemnity provision purports to require the
indemnitor to indemnify the indemnitee for the indemnitee's own
negligence, the contract clause must contain language that the
indemnitor is not required to indemnify the indemnitee if the
indemnitee is the sole cause of the injury or damage.

Id. at 272.

There is a presumption against indemnity clauses which purport
to require the indemnitor to indemnify the indemnitee for the
indemnitee's own negligence, and the clause will be strictly
construed against the indemnitee.

Union Pacific Railroad v. El

Paso Natural Gas, 408 P.2d 910 (Utah 1965).

23.

In the case of Freund

v, Utah Power & Light, the court noted that it had been provided
with only three situations, where courts, applying Utah law, had
concluded that the language of the contract required the indemnitor
to cover for losses caused by the indemnitee's own negligence.
Freund v. Utah Power & Light. 625 F.Supp. 272 (D.Utah 1985).

The

court in Freund noted that in all three cases the indemnity
provisions in question included express language to the effect that
the indemnitor would not be required to indemnify the indemnitee
for the indemnitee's sole negligence.

Id. at 278.

The indemnity clause which Little America refers to in this
matter reads as follows:
4.18.1 The Contractor shall indemnify and hold
harmless the Owner and the Architect and their
agents and employees from and against all claims,
damages, losses and expenses including attorneys1
fees arising out of ,or resulting from the performance
of the Work, provided that any such claim, damage,
loss or expense (1) is attributable to bodily
injury, sickness, disease or death, or to injury
to or destruction of tangible property (other
than the Work itself) including the loss of use
resulting therefrom, and (2) is caused in whole
or in part by any negligent act or omission of the
Contractor, any Subcontractor, anyone directly or
indirectly employed by any of them or anyone for
whose acts any of them may be liable, regardless
of whether or not it is caused in part by a party
indemnified hereunder.
The last section of the quoted language apparently attempts to make
Okland responsible for indemnifying Little America for its own
negligence, yet nowhere in the quoted
29

language is there any

provision which would exclude Okland from having to indemnify
Little America for its sole negligence.

Therefore, the proposed

clause is void and unenforceable pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §13-81.
CONCLUSION
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 does not violate either "open
court" or "equal protection" constitutional challenges.

This was

true of the holding this Court in the case of Good v. Christensen.
and it is still true today.

This Court should not disturb the

Good decision, but allow it to stand pursuant to the doctrine of
stare decisis.

Also, §78-12-25.5 is a bar to all claims brought

against Okland arising out of the construction of the Little
America

Hotel,

including

Little

America's

claims

for

indemnification. Therefore, this Court should affirm both rulings
of the trial court below granting summary judgment in favor of
Okland.
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COMMENCEMENT OF THE RUNNING OF
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGINS
UPON THE ACCRUAL OF THE CAUSE ACTION, AND NOT UPON THE DATE OF
COMPLETION OF CONSTRUCTION
II
POINT III
THE DATE OF ACCRUAL OF THE CAUSE
OF ACTION IN THIS INSTANCE WAS JANUARY 1, 1973
16
POINT IV
SECTION 78-12-25.5, U.C.A. 1953, SHOULD
NOT BE APPLIED TO THIS CASE AS THAT
STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH AS WELL AS THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED SATES OF AMERICA
17
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES E. GOOD and MARY G.
GOOD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
DON M. CHRISTENSEN, DON M.
CHRISTENSEN
CONSTRUCTION
CO., CONSTRUCTION REALTY,
LEWIS C HANSEN and BILLIE J.
HANSEN,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
13659

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover for damages to propertysustained when a multi-car carport, owned by the plaintiffs and allegedly constructed and designed by the defendants, collapsed, causing damage to the plaintiffs,
allegedly as a result of negligent and unlawful design
on the part of the defendants.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants,
the Law and Motion Court granted the respective motions of all defendants for dismissal on the grounds that
the plaintiffs' claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff-appellants seek reversal of the trial
court's ruling that the plaintiffs' cause of action is barred
by the statute of limitations and an order remanding
the case to the District Court for further proceedings,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs in this action are the owners of an
apartment complex which had a multi-car carport standing upon it, adjacent to the apartment complex itself.
The carport was, admittedly, constructed prior to seven
(7) years before the commencement of this action. The
plaintiffs acquired their ownership interest in the apartmenc complex on April 16, 1969. (Plaintiffs' answers to
interrogatories.) And the plaintiffs had no knowledge
of the defects in design and construction of the carport
until its collapse on January 1, 1973.
The carport collapsed, thus injuring and damaging
the property of the plaintiffs on January 1, 1973- The
plaintiffs contend that the collapse of the carport in
question, and the resulting damage and injury to the
property of the plaintiffs, was occasioned by the negligence and unlawful design and construction of the carport
by the defendants.
ARGUMENT
The Judge in the Law and Motion Court for the
Third Judicial District, granted the motions to dismiss
brought on behalf of all defendants in this actioa. The
basis for the granting of those motions was the statute of
2

limitations. Counsel for the defendants, Don M. Christensen, dba Don M. Christensen Construction Company
and Construction Realty based his entire argument on
the statute of limitations. Counsel for the defendants
Lewis G Hansen and Billie J. Hansen included in his
argument a contention that no duty existed between those
defendants and the plaintiff. The Court requested memorandums of points and authorities on the question of
the application of the various statutes of limitations.
The question of lack of duty was outside the scope of
the memorandums requested by the Court. As the motions of both sets of defendants were granted, it must be
concluded that the Court made its ruling on the basis
of its interpretation of the statutes of limitations, without
regard to the question of a lack of duty.
Additionally, as was pointed out in the memorandum submitted by counsel for the defendants Christensen, plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges that "the defendants herein designed and constructed a multi-unit
carport . . .," and that the said carport "was negligently
designed and negligently constructed, and that the aforementioned multi-car carport was not constructed in accordance with governmental standards and regulations
set out for the controlling of the building and construction of such structllres. ,, As such, a duty is implied under
Utah law. Counsel for the defendants Hansen apparently
contends that the facts are not sufficient to establish
such a duty as he contends that his clients did not, in
fact, participate in the design or construction of the carport. This matter is a matter for factual determination,
and not the proper basis for a motion to dismiss. The

3

Utah Court

has held that the pleadings in such a case

need not anticipate all defenses possibly proposed
nelly

vs. First Federal

Building

and Loan

107 Utah 3 8 1 , 154 P2d 620; Bennion
Savings

and Loan Association,

(Nun-

Association,

vs. First

Federal

107 Utah 3 8 1 , 154 P2d

634) and that the import and intention of a pleading
will be assumed.
Section 385 of the Restatement

of the Law of

Torts,

2d ed., states as follows:
O n e w h o on behalf of the possessor of land
erects a structure or creates any other condition
thereon is subject to liability to others u p o n or
oucside of the land for physical h a r m caused to
them by the dangerous character of the structure
or condition after his w o r k has been accepted by
:he possessor, under the same rules as those det e r m i n i n g the liability of one w h o as m a n u f a c t u r e r
or independent contractor makes a chattel for
the use of othersF u r t h e r , Prosser, in his Handbook
of the Law of
Torts, at Section 104, p a g e 681 (4th ed., 1971) states as
follows:
I t is n o w the almost universal r u l e t h a t the
contractor (builder) is liable to all those w h o may
foreseeably be injured by the structure, n o t only
w h e n he fails to disclose dangerous conditions
k n o w n to him, b u t also w h e n the w o r k is neglig e n t l y done. W i t h cases cited therein:
Moran
vs. Pittsburgh
- Des Moines Steel Company,
166
F. 2d 908 ( C A . 3 - 1948), Cert, denied 334 U.S.
846, 68 S.Ct. 1561, 92 L. ed. 1770; Hale
vs.
Depaoli,
33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 ( 1 9 4 8 ) ;
Hunter vs. Quality Homes, 68 A. 2d 620 ( D e l 1949); Wright vs. Holland Furnace Company, 186
M i n n . 265, 243 N . W . 387.

4

T h e defendants in this action contend that the claim
b r o u g h t by the plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations, specifically Section 78-12-25.5 and Section 78-1225(2) U.C.A. 1953.
Plaintiffs contend, and will demonstrate, that the
seven (7) year statute of limitations imposed by Section
78-12-25.5, U.C.A. 1953, does not apply to these plaintiffs as they are specifically exempted by the language
of that statute; and that Section 78-12-25(2) U.C.A. 1953
does apply to this situation, but that it applies from the
date of the accrual of the action, a n d not from the date
of the completion of construction.

And that the accrual

of the acuse of action took place on J a n u a r y I, 1973-

POINT I
S E C T I O N 78-12-25.5, U.C.A. 1953, DOES
N O T A P P L Y T O T H I S I N S T A N C E SO AS
T O IiMPOSE A SEVEN Y E A R S T A T U T E
OF LIMITATIONS, FROM THE DATE
OF COMPLETION OF CONSTRUCTION,
AS T H A T S T A T U T E SPECIFICALLY EXE M P T S T H E P L A I N T I F F S I N T H I S ACT I O N , AS O W N E R S I N A C T U A L POSSESSION, F R O M ITS A P P L I C A T I O N .
T h e seven year statute of limitations does not apply
in this case. Section 78-12-25.5 established a limitation
against actions b r o u g h t more than "seven years after the
completion of construction." It has this effect, however,
with one noticeable a n d i m p o r t a n t exception. T h e limitation does not apply to persons in situations such as the
plaintiffs herein. T h e fourth p a r a g r a p h of Section 78-1225.5, U.C.A. 1953, provides as follows:
5

The limitation imposed by this provision shall
not apply to any person in actual possession and
control as owner, tenant or otherwise of the improvement at the time the defective and unsafe
condition of such improvement constitutes the
proximate cause of the injury for which it is proposed to bring an action.
Thus, the entire statute of limitations section that we
are dealing with does not apply to any person in actual
possession as owner. The plaintiffs in this case are the
owners of the damaged property, and they were in possession of the defective and unsafe condition at the time
that the proximate cause of the injury occurred. Thus,
this statute of limitations, 78-12-25.5, does not apply to
the plaintiffs and that they should, therefore, be allowed
to bring their action under other statutes of limitations
which have as the date for the beginning of the commencement of the running of the statute the date of
accrual of the acuse of action. The plaintiffs contend that
the above quoted language clearly applies to the situation where the owner, or other person in actual possession, is seeking recovery against the design or construction professional. Counsel for the defendants Hansen
and counsel for the defendants Christensen contend that
this subsection should be construed as having reference
to actions being brought against the owner or other person in possession, as opposed to actions by the owner
against the design or construction professionals. They
further contend that the intent of the statute is "obviously'*
on their side. However, why would it be the intent of the
legislature to exempt actions against owners, or other persons in actual possession, since those persons are not in the
class of person sought to be protected by the statute in
general? The class sought to be protected is the class of
6

"person(s) performing or furnishing the design, planning,
supervision of construction or construction/'
To contrue the paragraph of the statute in question
as proposed by the defendants would be to avoid the purposes of the legislature as it would exempt the owners,
etc., from the protection of an act in which they were
not included. The paragraph in question would have
to be construed as being totally without meaning. It's
legal effect would be the same as if it had not been included in the statute in the first place. We must conclude
that the legislature had some purpose for the insertion
of the paragraph in question. Therefore, it must be construed as an exemption to the protection given to design
and construction professionals.
The plaintiffs in this action are aware of decisions
by two courts wherein the question facing the court in
this instance was raised. The courts that reviewed the
question were the Supreme Court of the State of New
Hampshire and the Superior Court of New Jersey.
The State of New Hampshire has a six year statute
of limitation providing protection for those designing,
planning, supervising or constructing improvements to
real property which contains a sentence which reads as
follows:
This limitation shall not apply to any person
in actual possession and control as owner, tenant
or otherwise of the improvement at the time the
defective and unsafe condition of such improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury
for which it is proposed to bring an action. (N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 508: 4-B—1968)
7

As can be seen, this language is almost precisely
the same as the language in the Utah statute. In 1973,
in the case of Deschamps vs. Camp Dresser and McKee,
Inc., 306 A.2d 771, questions of law concerning this statute, and the construction of the section were certified
by the United States District Court for the District of
New Hampshire to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, and the Supreme Court of New Hampshire decided
and ruled that the import of this subsection preserves
the right of one in possession and control to sue without
regard to the six year statute of limitation. The question
certified to the Supreme Court of the State of New
Hampshire reads as follows:
(A) Whether N . H. RSA 508: 4-B permits 'Any
person in actual possession and control as
owner, tenant, or otherwise of the improvement at the time the defective and unsafe
condition of such improvement constitutes
the proximate cause of the injury for which
it is proposed to bring an action' to bring
suit against 'any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of
construction or construction of such improvement to real property more than six years
after the performance or furnishing of such
services and construction?'
The Court in that case first recognized the accepted
proposition that ordinarily a cause of action accrues and
begins to run at the time of the occurrence of the iajury,
but recognized that this specific section began to run
from the occurrence of the negligent act. They thereafter determined that the subsection in question did not
apply to an action by an owner or other person in actual
8

possession against the design professional and that, on
that basis, the ordinary rules pertaining to the running
of the statute of limitations would apply, and the cause
of action would not be barred by the statute of limitations as it accrued when the injury occurred. The court
stated their interpretation of the law, at page 773, as
follows:
W h e n it says that 'this limitation shall not
apply' the court is referring to the limitation on
plaintiffs as they are the ones who b r i n g 'action
to recover damages.' T h e exception would be
meaningless
if it were read to apply to actions
against owners, tenants and others in possession
and control, as defendants, because they are not
included in the class against whom actions are
barred by the six year limitation, namely persons
'performing or furnishing the design, planning,
supervision of construction or construction of the
improvement . . . .' T h e r e would be no need to
exclude those in possession from a class in which
they were never included in the first place. O n
the other hand those in possession and control
w o u l d be included in the class of persons w h o
would be barred from bringing suit if it were not
for the exception which was intended to remove
them from that class.
The court went on to say:
W e hold that the second sentence of RSA 508:
4-B preserves the right of one in possession and
control to sue w i t h o u t regard to the limitation of
the first sentence.
In the Deschamps

decision, they recognized the fact

that the N e w Jersey Court had ruled in the case of
Salesian Society vs. Formigli

Corporation,

9

120 N . J . Super.

493, 295 A.2d(1972) in a fashion contrary to their decision. In rejecting the conclusions arrived at in the
Salesian Society case, they stated as follows:
We cannot adopt the reasoning of that case
however, in view of what we consider to be clear
language to the contrary.
Plaintiffs herein agree that the language of the statute before us is clear, and further agree with the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire that the opinion in the Salesian
Society case is not persuasive. If the legislature had intended to include the word "against" before "any person
in actual possession and control as owner, tenant, or
otherwise," as the New Jersey Court argues, the legislature could have easily done so. To insert the word
"against" is to legislate in what we believe is contrary
to the intention of the legislature.
Therefore, it can be seen that the paragraph in question exempts actions by owners and against design or
construction professionals from the application of the
seven year statute of limitations. To state that the paragraph in question exempts actions against owners (without any regard to design or construction professions) is
to render the paragraph meaningless. The statute of limitations designated as 78-12-25.5 simply does not apply
to actions by owners in possession against design or construction professionals. Thus it does not apply to the
plaintiffs in this action.
As a result of the fact that the plaintiffs in this
action are exempt from the application of the sevea year
10

statute of limitations the standard statutes of limitations
are brought into play, and the date for the commencement of the running of those statutes of limitations is the
date of the "accrual of the action,"

POINT II
AS SECTION 78-12-25.5 DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS INSTANCE, THE TIME
FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGINS UPON THE ACCRUAL OF THE CAUSE ACTION, AND
N O T UPON THE DATE OF COMPLETION OF CONSTRUCTION.
As Section 78-12-25.5 does not apply to the circumstances of this case, plaintiffs contend that Section
78-12-25.5(2), with its four year statute of limitations,
control the action. Plaintiffs further contend that Section 78-12-25(2) commences to run from the date of the
accrual of the action. Plaintiffs do not seek to have that
section modified in any way, and in fact, insist that the
standard rules that apply to that section be applied in
this instance. Plaintiffs have specific reference to the
controlling legal concept that causes of action accrue
when the injury occurs.
In the introductory section to the limitations of actions chapter of Title 78, Utah Code Anno., we find the
following guideline:
78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally. — Civil Actions can be commenced only
within the periods prescribed in this chapter,
11

after the cause of action shall have accruedf except
where in special cases a different limitation is
prescribed by statute. (Emphasis added)
Thus Section 78-12-25-5 cannot be used to modify
the nature of when a cause of action shall have accrued
under Section 78-12-25(2). Section 78-12-25(2) provides:
This provision shall not be construed as extending or limiting the periods otherwise prescribed
by the laws of this state for the bringing of any
action.
In accordance with that provision, the plaintiffs
herein contend that the standard rules for the dating of
:he accrual of a cause of action must apply to Section
78-12-25(2).
As was pointed out in the Deschamps Case, supra.,
sxzXMtos of limitations on design and construction professionals are different from most all other statutes of
limitations in that they run from a specific point in time
rather than from the time of an injury. In fact, the
statute of limitations received strong support during the
1960's for passage from architects, engineers and others
in the construction fields because the potential liability
against them could have gone on continuously as causes
of action do not arise until injuries occur. In the Deschamps Case, the court recognized this fact and stated as
follows:
The unique feature of RSA 508: 4-b which distinguishes it from most statutes of limitations in
negligence actions is that the time begins to run
from the time the services are performed rather
than from the time of injury. Causes of action
12

for negligence do not arise at the occurrence of
the negligent act but rather when the damages
result.
A recovery is not possible until a cause of action
exists. Further, a cause of action does not exist until
conduct causes injury that produces loss or damage. No
recovery is possible until damages have occurred. Damages are an integral part of any cause of action, and no
cause of action exists until damages occur. Saylor vs.
Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218. In the instant case, the plaintiffs
suffered no injury until the date that the damages to
them occurred.
This contention is supported by the U.S. Supreme
Court case of United States vs. Wurts, 303 U.S. 4 l 4 (1930)
where the court recognized the natural date of commencement for a cause of action and stated, at page 418, as
follows:
It would require language so clear as to leave
room for no other reasonable construction in order
to induce the belief that Congress intended a
statute of limitations to begin to run before the
right barred by it has accrued.
An action based upon negligence accrues when force
is wrongfully put in motion producing injury. (Konar
vs. Monro Muffler Shops, Inc., 280 N.Y.S. 2d 812, (1967).
See also Dalton vs. Dow Chemical Company, 158 N.W.
2d 580 (Minn. 1968); Rosenaw vs. New Brunswick, 238
A2d 169 (1968); White vs. Schnoebelen, 18 A2d 185
(N. H. 1941)) The following is found in the Kentucky
Law Journal in Volume 60 at page 462 (1972):
13

Therefore, the basic premise underlying any
theory of limitations is that the cause of action
must accrue before the time period begins to run.
The cause of action is said to accrue at different
times for different actions, that statutes uniformly
hold that the time limitation does not begin to
run until after the plaintiff has suffered injury
and thus has acquired the right to sue.
51 Am Jur 2d at page 703 sets out the general rule
as to when a cause of action accrues in tort actions as
follows:
The general rule that the statute of limitations
begins to run from the time that the cause of action accrues is fully applicable to tort actions,
and, as regards the running of the statute of limitations applicable to torts, a cause of action accrues only when the force wrongfully put in motion produces injury, the invasion of personal or
property rights occurring at that time.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State Tax Commission vs. Spanish fork, 99 Utah 177, 100 P.2d 575,
stated the law in Utah with reference to the accrual of
a cause of action as follows:
The question is then, when did the cause of action accrue? The general rule is that it accrues
at the time it becomes remediable in the courts,
that is when the claim is in such condition that
the courts can receive and give judgment if the
claim is established. (See cases cited therein.)
It is certainly true that the courts cannot proceed and
give judgment against any person if there are no damages, and if no injury has occurred. Thus, a cause of
action does not accrue until injury takes place. See also
O'Hair v>. Kounalis, 23 Utah 2d 355.
14

In the 1968 case of Christiansen

vs Reese, 20 Ut. 2d

199, 436 P.2d 435, the Utah Supreme Court, in a medical
malpractice action, ruled that the statute of limitations
commenced to run when the patient learned of the presence of a foreign object in his body. Though the court
did not adopt what is commonly referred to as "discovery
rule," it also held that the date of commencement of the
accrual of the cause of action would not be the date of
the negligent act of the physician. The court left the
question of whether or not the patient commenced an
action within four years after he knew, or should have
known, of the presence of a surgical needle in his body,
as an issue to be resolved by the jury. The court stated
the proposition as follows:
Therefore, we now hold that, regardless of prior
pronouncements, where a foreign object is negligently left in the body of a patient during an operation, and the patient is ignorant of the fact, and
consequently of his right of action for malpractice,
the cause of action does not accrue until the patient
learned of the presence of such foreign object in
his body. . . . However, upon the record it is our
judgment that the question of whether the plaintiff commenced his action within four years after
he knew, or should have known, of the presence
of the surgical needle in his body is an issue to be
resolved by the trial of the facts.
Thus it can be seen that Utah follows the normal rule
of law in the question as to when a cause of action accrues.
A cause of action cannot accrue until it is fully remediable in the courts. A remedy cannot be provided until
damage and injury occur.

15

POINT

III

THE DATE OF ACCRUAL OF THE CAUSE OF
ACTION IN THIS INSTANCE WAS JANUARY 1, 1973.

case
tiffs
that
also

The cause of action belonging to the plaintiff in this
accrued on January 1, 1973. On that date, the plainfirst learned of the defects in design and workmanship
existed in the carport in question. On that date, they
suffered damages to their property.

Prior to January 1, 1973, no cause of action existed.
Additionally, no right to collect damages existed. There
is no evidence that the plaintiffs knew, or should have
I nown. of the potentially dangerous situation. Further,
there is no contention of such prior knowledge raised by
the defendants. Thus the question of discovery is not an
issue in this action.
Because of the fact that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover damages against the defendants until
after January 1, 1973, and because of the fact that they
were not aware of the defects in workmanship and design
until that date, the cause of action in this matter did not
arise until January 1, 1973. Therefore, the statute of limitations, as set out in Section 78-12-25(2) U.C.A. 1953, did
not commence to run until January 1, 1973, and the complaints against the respective defendants in this action
were filed well within the time alloted by that statute of
limitations.

16

POINT

IV

SECTION 78-12-25.5, U.CA. 1953, SHOULD
NOT BE APPLIED TO THIS CASE AS THAT
STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH AS WELL AS THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
The seven year statute of limitations, which commences to run from the date of completion of construction, is violative of constitutional requirements because
it stems from a total change and departure from the traditional method of applying and enforcing statutes of
limitations. This substantial change, when put into effect, was done so without adequate reference and relations to the constitutional requirements involved. Plaintiffs contend that such a review and such requirements cannot be ignored without prejudicing rights guaranteed and
assured by the Constitution of the State of Utah and the
United States of America.
Though the Court need not face the question of constitutionality, because this Section (78-12-25.5) does not
apply to these plaintiffs on its face, the Section is manifestly unconstitutional.
Unlike almost all other statutes of limitations in
Utah, this Section sets as the commencement date for the
running of the statute the date of "the completion of construction/' As such it can have the effect of extinguishing
a cause of action before that cause of action comes into
existence. This is a violation of the due process and equal

17

protection provisions of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as Sections 2, 7, and
11 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
Section 2 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of
Utah guarantees equal protection; Section 7 assures due
process of law; and Section 11 provides that:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered w i t h o u t denial or unnecessary delay; . . . .
Section 78-12-25.5 denies a remedy for an injury done
to a person before the injury occurs and before the cause
or action accrues and thus violates the provisions of Section 11 of the Constitution of the State of U t a h a n d in
t u r n violates the due process and equal protection provisions of the Constitution of the State of U t a h a n d the Constitution of the United States. Those constitutional provisions place limitations u p o n the legislature to p r e v e n t them
from closing the doors of the courts to persons w h o w o u l d
otherwise have a legally enforceable right u n d e r a k n o w n
remedy.

Brown

vs. Wrigbtman,

47 U t a h 3 1 , 151 Pac.

366. Except for the provisions of Section 78-12-25.5 persons with injuries such as the plaintiffs' in this section,
w o u l d have a right to enforce their remedy u n d e r k n o w n
a n d accepted concepts of law.
Section 28 of the Limitation of Actions T o p i c of 51
Am Jur 2d at page 613 states the general

lata in this area

as follows:
However, all statutes of limitation m u s t proceed
on the theory that the party has full o p p o r t u n i t y
18

afforded him to try his rights in the courts, and
where a statute of limitations would operate so
as to bar all recovery without any allowance of
time for the commencement thereof in failure, it
is usually deemed to be unconstitutional in its
operation on vested rights. It is not within the
power of the legislature, under the guise of a limitation provision, to cut off an existing remedy
entirely, since this would amount to a denial of
justice, . . . .
Cases cited therein.
Statutes of limitations against architects, engineers
and designers and others in the building industry differ
widely from state to state. A number of state legislatures
have attempted to avoid the question of constitutionality
by having the statute only apply to patent as opposed to
latent defects (such as Miss Code Ann. Section 720.5-supp.
1969), or where there is fraud (Ark. Stat. Ann. Section 37242-Supp. 1967); (Tenn. Code Ann. Section 28-317-supp.
1967), and others provide for the contribution or indemnity by owners or others responsible against designers and
contractors after the limitation period has run (N. J.
Stat. Ann. Section 2A:l4-l.l-supp. 1968; N. C. Gen.
Stat. Section l-50(5)-supp. 1965; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12,
Section 65.1 (4)-supp. 1969; Wise. Stat. Ann. Section
893.155 - 1966). Statutes vary from state to state in terms
of who is protected, what time limitation is imposed, when
the commencement event will be, as well as in other
aspects. Such distinctions are apparently a result of an
attempt to have the statute of limitations in each state
interact appropriately with the rest of the state's comprehensive limitations of action statutes. The California
statute, for example, establishes a four year period, but
19

limits its effect to tort or contracts actions arising out of
patent deficiencies only. It further totally exempts owneroccupied single unit residences from the application of
limitation. (Cal. Civ. Pro. Code Section

337.1(f)-West

Supp. 1968).
T h r e e states, whose statutes are similar in many respects to Utah's statutes, have, in fact, ruled such statutes
of limitations unconstitutional. In the first of these, the
Illinois Supreme Court in 1967 in the case of Skinner
Anderson,
tion

38 111. 2d 4 5 5 ; 231 N.E. 2d 588, held Sec-

29 of the Illinois' Limitation

design

vs.

professionals

and

contractors,

Act,

referring

to

unconstitutional.

T h a t action was b r o u g h t by a widow a n d m o t h e r of two
persons killed when, because of lack of ventilation, refrigeration gases leaked into a boiler room, corroded

the

b u r n e r and caused lethal gas to escape, thus causing the
death of the husband and daughter, against the building
contractor and architect a n d a service r e p a i r m a n . T h e
Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lov/er c o u r t decision,
which imposed the statute of limitations, on t h e basis that
the statute of limitations violated Section 22, Article IV of
the Illinois Constitution, which provided that the legislature should not pass any local or "special laws . . . granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever." (It should be here noted that U t a h has an almost
exactly similar statute which provides, in Article VI Section 26 as follows:
T h e legislature is prohibited from enacting any
private or special laws in the following cases: . . .
(16) G r a n t i n g to any individual, association or corporation any privilege, immunity or franchise.)
20

T h e Illinois Supreme Court stated that the constitutional
provisions required legislative classifications to be reasonably related to legislative purchase and that the statute
of limitations violated the State Constitution because it
omitted and denied recovery arbitrarily and because the
classifications were not rational. The court recognized
that the equal protection clause of the 14th A m e n d m e n t
does not deny a state the p o w e r to classify, but prohibits
classification without any reasonable basis. N o t i n g that
the statute applied to design professionals and contractors, b u t not to materialism, the court in the Skinner

Case,

concluded that the classification therein was unreasonable,
for either class' negligence d u r i n g construction

might

cause injury within the four year period. T h e classification thus provided an immunity for suit after the four
year period to one classification, design professionals and
contractors, while denying it to another, materialism. (See
21 N . E . 2d 5 8 S a t 5 9 D
In 1973, the Court of Appeals in Kentucky, in the
case of Saylor vs. Hall, 497 S.W. 2d 2 IS, held another
statute similar to that which U t a h has, unconstitutional.
T h e Saylor

Case was an action for damages by tenants

against the builder, seeking to recover for the death of
one son of the tenant and injury to another caused by the
collapse of a fireplace. T h e statute of limitations in that
state provided a five year statute of limitations which
began to run at the date of the original occupancy of the
improvements which the builder caused to be erected.
T h e home was constructed in 1955, and the injury to the
plaintiffs' children occurred in 1969, well after the time
period set in the statute of limitations had run. T h e statute
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of limitations specifically provided that no actions sounding in tort resulting from a deficiency in construction of
any improvement to real property should be brought
after the expiration of the five year period.
The Kentucky Court ruled that its statute of limitation was unconstitutional because it violated a section of
the State Constitution which provided as follows:
Constitution Section 14. All courts shall be open
and every person, for an injury done to him in his
lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and right in justice
administered without sale, denial or delay.
'It should be noted that this section is substantially similar to Section 11 of Article I of the Constitution of the
State of Utah, as set out hereinabove.) In arriving at its
decision, the Kentucky Court reasoned as follows:
In our view, the application of these statutory expressions as to the claims here asserted destroys,
pro tanto, a common-law right of action for negligence that proximately causes personal injury or
death, which existed at the times the statutes were
enacted. The statutory expressions as they relate to
actions based on negligence perform an abortion on
the right of action, not in the first trimester, but
before conception. The right of action for negligence proximately causing injury or death, which
is constitutionally protected in this state, requires
more than mere conduct before recovery can be
attempted. Recovery is not possible until a cause
of action exists. A cause of action does not exist
until the conduct causes injury that produces loss
or damage. The action for negligence evolved
chiefly out of the old common-law form of action
on the case, and it has always retained the rule
22

of that action, that proof of damage was an essential part of die plaintiffs' case. (See 497 S.W. 2d
218 at page 224-225.)
Note that the court here recognizes the common-law rule
as to w h e n a cause of action accrues.

T o support that

proposition, it cites Prosser, Handbook

of the Law of

Torts, Section 30, page 143 (4th eq., 1971).
T h e court went on to say as follows:
Surely then, the application of proported limitation statutes in such m a n n e r as to destroy a cause
of action before it legally exists cannot be permissible if it accomplishes destruction of a constitutionally protected right of action.
Later in 1973, the H a w a i i Supreme Court in the case
cf Fujioka

vs. Kam, 514 P.2d 568, ruled that the H a w a i i

statute of limitations protecting persons providing the
"licensed services in the design, planning, supervision o r
observation of construction or construction of an improvement to real property , , as unconstitutional and violative of rules against special laws and of the equal protection guarantees of the United States Constitution a n d
the Constitution of the State of Hawaii. In that action, a
plaintiff minor sought recovery for damages against the
owners of a building and the owners in turn filed a thirdparty complaint against the engineer and general contractor involved in the construction of the building where a
roof collapsed and injured the minor plaintiff. A period
of more than ten years, the period set out in the statute of
limitations, had run between the completion of the building and the collapse of the roof, and the lower courts
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granted a motion for summary judgment brought by the
engineer and general contractor. The owners, on appeal,
for the first time, challenged the constitutionality of the
statute. The court agreed with their contention that the
statute was unconstitutional, and stated as follows:
The statute on one hand grants immunity to the
engineer and the contractor, who should or would
be, but for the statute, primarily responsible for
the injuries. On the other hand, the owners are burdened with the liability for the damages proximately caused by the negligence of the engineer
and the contractor that, under the common-law
rule in this jurisdiction, the owners are under a
duty to use reasonable care for the safety of all
persons reasonably expected to be on the premises.
(Cases cited) In spite of this unfair result the engineer and the contractor contend that the statute
does not violate the equal protection guarantee of
the State Constitution.
. . . We are unable to see any rational basis for
treating the engineer and the contractor differently
from the owners under the same circumstances.
It is clear that the classification does not rest upon
some reasonable consideration of differences (between the classes under the same circumstances),
which have a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation. Nor is the classification
founded upon a reasonable distinction or difference
necessitated by state policy. A statute making such
an unsupportable classification fails to meet the
requirements of the equal protection guarantee.
Morey vs. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-469, 77 Ct.
1344, I L. ed. 2d 1485 (and other cases cited therein).
It can therefore be seen that states with statutes comparable to the Utah statute of limitations, with consti24

tutional provisions very nearly the same as those found in
the Utah State Constitution, have determined that such
statutes of limitations as we have here to protect architects, engineers, design professionals and contractors, are
unconstitutional.

The plaintiffs herein, James E. Good

and Mary G. Good, contend that the Utah State statute of
limitations is also unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
T h e provisions of the seven year statute of limitations
against architects and design and construction professionals, as found in Section 78-12-25.5 U . C A . 1953, does not
apply in the instant case because the plaintiffs herein are
"owners or others in actual possession." Their cause of
action is not controlled by the limitation. T h u s , we must
t u r n to the other statutes of limitations that w o u l d apply
in this instance. T h a t statute is the limitation provision
found in 78-12-25(2). A n d it does not commence to r u n
until the cause of action accrues. T h u s , it did not commence to run until J a n u a r y 1, 1973, because of the fact
that a cause of action does not accrue until injury and
d a m a g e is sustained.
T h u s it is the position of the plaintiffs in this action
that their cause of action againt the defendants is not
barred by any statute of limitations in Utah. And, in the
event that it were, that such a bar w o u l d be violative of
the provisions of the Utah State Constitution and of the
Constitution of the United States of America.
T h e trial court erred in g r a n t i n g defendants' motions
for a dismissal. It so erred in failing to accurately con25

strue the language of Section 78-12-25.5. The trial court
erred further in failing to rule that the statute of limitations in question is unconstitutional.
Wherefore, plaintiffs-appellants respectfully pray
that the trial court's judgment of dismissal be reversed
and that the case be remanded to the District Court for
further proceedings and that the plaintiff-appellants be
awarded their costs herein.

TIM DALTON DUNN, for:
HANSON, WADSWORTH & RUSSON
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES E. GOOD and MARY G.
GOOD,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
13659

DON M. CHRISTENSEN, DON M.
CHRISTENSEN CONSTRUCTION CO.,
CONSTRUCTION REALTY, LEWIS C
HANSEN and BILLIE J. HANSEN,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E CASE
Plaintiffs-Appellants

b r o u g h t suit in the

District

Court for Salt Lake County alleging the negligent design
and construction of a multi-car carport which

plaintiffs

alleged had been designed and constructed by Defendants Don M. Christensen, Don M. Christensen Construction Company, and Construction Realty, which was originally built for Defendants Lewis C. Hansen and Billie J.
Hansen, more than seven years previously.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER

COURT

Defendants-Respondents moved for Summary Judgment alleging that the seven-year statute of limitations set
forth in Section 78-12-25.5 of the Utah Code Annotated
1

(1973 Supp.) and the four-year statute of limitations set
forth in Section 78-12-25(2) of the Utah Code Annotated
(1973 Supp.) barred Plaintiffs-Appellants' action, and
the Lower Court granted Defendants-Respondents' motions.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Respondents seek denial of Plaintiffs'
appeal and affirmance of the Order entered by the Lower
Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants Don M, Christenben, Don M. Christensen Construction Company and Construction Realty (hereinafter "Christensen") designed and
constructed a multi-car carport in 1965. Defendants Lewis
C. Hansen and Billie J. Hansen (hereinafter "Hansen")
were the parties in actual possession and control as owners
at the time the carport was designed and constructed. In
1969, Plaintiffs James E. Good and Mary G. Good acquired
an ownership interest in the carport. On January 1, 1973,
subsequent to a heavy snowfall, which caused ejctensive
damage throughout the area, the carport collapsed. This
action was not commenced until more than seven years
after the construction of the carport.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS ARE BARRED FROM BRINGING THIS ACTION BY
SECTION 78-12-25.5 OF THE UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED (1973 SUPP.).
2

Section 78-12-25.5 of the Utah Code Annotated (1973
Supp.) is specifically intended to cover the situation in
the instant case. The statute reads as follows:
" I N J U R Y DUE T O DEFECTIVE D E S I G N
OR CONSTRUCTION OF I M P R O V E M E N T T O
REAL PROPERTY — W I T H I N SEVEN YEARS.
— No action to recover damages for any injnry
to property, real or personal, or for any injury to
the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death,
arising out of the defective and unsafe
condition
of an improvement
to real property, nor any action
for damages sustained on account of such injury,
shall be brought against any person performing or
furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or construction of such improvement
to
real property more than seven years after the completion of
construction.
"(1) 'Person' shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, or any other legal entity.
(2) Completion of construction for the purposes of this act shall mean the date of issuance of
a certificate of substantial completion by the owner, architect, engineer or other agents, or the date
of the owner's use or possession of the improvement on real property.
" T h e limitation imposed by this provision
shall not apply to any person in actual possession
and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the
i m p r o v e m e n t at the time the defective and unsafe
condition of such improvement constitutes the
proximate cause of the injury for which it is proposed to bring an action.
" T h i s provision shall not be construed as extending or limiting the periods otherwise prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any
action." (Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-25.5
(1973 Supp.) (Emphasis added)
0

The preamble to this Act was adopted by the Legislature and explains the statute as follows:
"An Act Enacting a New Section 78-12-25.5
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Relating to the Limitations of Actions by Providing a Time Limit in
Which Actions for Injury to Property or Death
Must Be Brought Against Persons W h o Performed or Furnished the Design, Planning, Supervision
or Construction of Improvements on Real Property/' (Laws of Utah, 1967, Chapter 218)
Section 78-12-25.5 is an expression of the legislative
policy decision that there should not be indefinite liability
in cases such as the instant one. This determination is
within the discretion of the Legislature. It determines that
if no cause of action arises within seven years from the date
of construction of an improvement to real property that
the expiration of that time period is prima facie evidence
that there was no faulty construction. This determination
is to give effect to the legislative policy decision to bar
litigation arising out of actions which occurred a longer
time prior to the institution of the litigation than the
number of years of the applicable statute of limitations.
Similar statutes are applicable in all areas of the law.
The legislative intent in enacting this statute was to avoid
spurious claims, to put a limit on the amount of time in
which a party can rely on construction defects without
taking into consideration the necessary subsequent maintenance of such property, and to avoid the obvious problems regarding the admission of evidence years after the
activity in question.
The Supreme Court said in the case of Price v. Tattle,
70 Utah 156, 258 Pac. 1016 (1927):
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"(1) In the construction of statutes it is the
duty of courts to ascertain the intent of the legislative body and, if the legislation is within the constitutional power of the Legislature, to enforce
that intent. In determining the intent of legislation not only the language of the act may be considered, b u t the purposes or objects sought by the
Legislature should be and are considered by the
courts in determining the legislative intent."
A case closely analogous to the instant case is Joseph
v. Burns,

260 Ore. 493, 491 P.2d 203, (1971). In this

case, the owners and others b r o u g h t an action against the
architects and engineers for damages resulting from a
collapsed roof. T h e Oregon limitations law provided that
no action could be b r o u g h t more than ten years after the
"act or omission complained of."

T h e Oregon Supreme

Court held that the ten-year statute of limitations applied
". . . . from the date of the act or omission regardless
of w h e n the d a m a g e resulted or w h e n the act or omission
was discovered."
T h e W a s h i n g t o n Supreme Court reached a similar
decision in the case of Yakima

Frz/it & Cold Storage

Co.

v. Central Heat & P. Co., 81 W a s h . 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108,
(1972).

In that decision, the Court discussed a similar

W a s h i n g t o n statute involving actions arising out of defects in improvements to real property. The Court held
that real property improvement, namely, the re-installation of pipes, coils, hangers, and rods that replaced those
which had been a part of the cold storage warehouse building for forty years, was completed in 1961, but where the
suit against the contractor was not instituted until after
a portion of that cold storage system and equipment had
5

collapsed in 1968, the suit was barred by the statute of
limitations because the cause of action did not accrue
within six years of the date of the completion of the work
by the contractor. The Court in Yakima pointed out that
since 1961 more than twenty states have enacted similar
statutes to actions arising out of defects in improvements
to real property. The Court also pointed out that in the
case of Skinner v. Anderson, 38 111. 2d 455, 231 N.E. 588,
(1967) (also cited by Plaintiffs) the Illinois Court declared the Illinois statute unconstitutional as being special
legislation in favor of only architects and contractors. The
Washington Court distinguished the statute cited in the
Yakima case from the statute in the Skinner case because
che scope of the Washington statute is not limited as co
vocation. The Utah statute is also not limited as to vocation. The Utah statute bars actions against any person
performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction, or construction of an improvement
to real property.
In the case of Salesian Society v. Formigli Corporation, 120 N J . Super. 493, 295 A.2d 19, (1972), in a suit
by a building owner more than thirteen years after construction against a contraaor and sub-contractor where
the applicable statute limited the time period for bringing
such action to ten years, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that this statute was not a statute of limitations but
rather "the statute prevents from ever arising a cause of
action against members of the protected class at a given
point in time. ,,

6

By looking at the preamble and the body of the
statute together, w e see that the obvious intent of the
Legislature was to place a seven-year statute of limitations
on the claims for anyone suffering injury or death by a
person w h o built, designed, planned, or supervised construction or improvement on real property. This statute
applies specifically to the conduct here in question. This,
as a specific statute versus the broad statute of any ". . .
action for relief not otherwise provided for by law,"
should take precedence over that broader statute where the
action comes within its provisions. Plaintiffs'

argument

that this statute does not apply refers only to the fourth
p a r a g r a p h . In that paragraph, by limiting this statute with
respect to owners and persons in actual possession or control of the property, the Legislature is saying that the person w h o is in possession or control at the time of the creation of the "defective and unsafe condition" does not come
within these provisions. This is an exception made by the
Legislature based on the policy that the owner at the time
of the construction and the creation of the "defective and
unsafe condition" should be exempt from this seven-year
statute of limitations. T h e persons in actual possession
and control at the time of construction and completion of
construction

were

Hansen

possession

had

not

Plaintiffs
at

the

Good.

time

T h u s , if there was any defective

of

and

Defendants
construction.

unsafe

condi-

tion created, it was created d u r i n g the possession and
ownership of

Hansens.

In the case of Salesian Society

vs. Formigli

Corpora-

tion, supra, the N e w Jersey Court was required to interpret a clause in the N e w Jersey statute which is identical
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to the clause brought into question by the Plaintiff in the
instant case. After a lengthy discussion within which the
Court referred to Comment, "Limitation of Actions Statutes for Architects and Builders — Blueprints for Nonaction," 18 Catholic U. L. Rev. 361, (1969), and Hearing
No. 7 on H.R. 6527, H.R. 6678, and H.R. 11544 before
Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the District of Columbia, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 11, 24, 29,
(1967), the Court then went on to hold that Mthe legislative intent was to insulate contractors, architects, planners
and designers from all claims, whether in tort or in contract . . . ." What the Legislature intended to preserve
was the right to make a claim against a person "in actual
possession or control as owner, tenant or otherwise/' at the
time of the creation of the defective condition.
The effect of this clause in this statute is that potential
liability for dangerous conditions is left on the owner or
other person in possession if an injury is caused by circumstances giving rise to a cause of action. The Legislature
meant to exclude from liability persons (such as Defendants herein) who have been long out of possession and
without the right or duty to make inspections and repairs for conditions that may be discovered within the
seven-year time period.
Since the Plaintiffs were not in possession, they were
cut off by the preceding parts of this statute. Any other
construction would lead to an almost total obliteration of
the statute. It would mean that only trespassers or strangers would have the law extended from the four-year statute of limitations to a seven-year statute. It is the function
8

of the courts to give legal effect to the intent of the Legislature, not to thwart the obvious legislative intent. (See 50
Am. Jur.,
Bank,

Statutesj

Section

227;

Parkinson

v.

State

84 U t a h 278, 35 P.2d 814, (1934), 94 ALR 112;

A. Booth & Co. v. Weigand,
(1906); Rospigliosi

30 Utah 135, 83 Pac. 734,

v. Glenallen

Mining

452 Pac. 276, (1926); Price v. Tuttle,

Co., 69 Utah 4 1 ,
supra.

A statute identical to the Utah statute was upheld in
N e w Jersey in the case of Rosenberg

v. North Bergen

Tp.,

61 N J . 190, 293 A.2d 662, (1972), in which the Court
held:
" T h e injured party has literally no cause of
action. T h e harm that has been done is d a m n u m
absque injuria — a w r o n g for which the law affords no redress. T h e function of the statute is thus
rather to define substantive rights rather than to
alter or modify a remedy. A legislature is entirely
at liberty to enact new laws or abolish old ones as
long as no vested right is disturbed."
In that case that statute was attacked on exactly the
same g r o u n d s as Plaintiff is attacking this statute in the
instant case. T h a t statute was upheld and Plaintiff was
denied his right of action in that statute.
Plaintiff relies on Descbar?ips
McKee,

v. Camp

Dresser

&

Inc., ( N . Hamp.) 306 A.2d 771, (1973). T h a t is

the only case Defendants have found supporting Plaintiffs, and since it does not give sufficient facts to determine
whether or not it is distinguishable from the instant case
and no authority or reasoning is therein cited to support
that Court's decision, Defendants find that case less than
persuasive.
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The Legislature intended that this statute govern this
particular type of action and therefore the Court should
affirm the Lower Court's decision that this statute does
govern the instant case.
POINT

II

EVEN IF THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS NOT
BARRED IN THE PROVISIONS OF 78-1225.5, THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AT SECTION 78-12-25 (2) IS AN
EFFECTIVE BAR TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs allege that Section 78-12-25 (2) which provides for a four-year statute of limitations is applicable
and that the four-year period runs from the time of the
discovery of the alleged defect or when with reasonable
diligence the alleged defect should have been discovered.
Plaintiffs allege that the carport in question was unlawfully designed and constructed because it failed to comply with local building code requirements. l a the Plaintiffs' answer to Interrogatory No. 6, specific items are
alleged to have been structurally inadequate. Since Plaintiffs' cause of action is based upon structural defects, those
defects should have been obvious to Plaintiffs at the time
they took possession of the property. The construction
work complained of was open and obvious to anyone
looking at it. There was no concealment or hidden defect. Anyone in possession knew or should have known
of its defective condition at that time. Therefore, the
cause of action accrued at the time of completion of that
construction. In the case of State Tax Commission v. Span10

ish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 100 P.2d 575, (1940), cited at page
14 of Plaintiffs' brief, the Court stated as follows:
"The question is then, when did the cause of
action accrue? The general rule is that it accrues
at the time it becomes remediable in the courts,
that is when the claim is in such condition that the
courts can receive and give judgment if the claim
is established."
Assuming arguendo that the carport had been negligently constructed and unlawfully designed as alleged
by Plaintiffs, in that case, the alleged defects would have
been discoverable and therefore remediable at the time of
completion of the construction and the cause of action
would have accrued at that time.
In Poole v. Terminix, 200 F.2d 746 (D.C Cir. 1952),
Plaintiff had sought damages for breach of an implied
warranty by the Defendant to do a workmanlike job in
insulating Plaintiffs house against termites. In that case,
Plaintiff charged that in the course of the work the Defendant drilled holes in the cement floor of Plaintiff's
basement and then filled these holes with cement. Plaintiff alleged that the drilling damaged some tile drain beneath the floor, resulting in dampness in the basement,
but the alleged injury was not discovered until some time
later when leakage made the dampness visible. Defendant raised the three-year statute of limitations as a defense.
The suit had been filed more than three years after the
work was done but within three years from the time when
the alleged injury was discovered. Plaintiff contended
that the statute did not begin to run until such discovery
or by the exercise of ordinary diligence he would have
11

discovered the breach. T h e Court held that for the statute
of limitations to begin at any time other than w h e n a cause
of action arose that situation must be limited to one with
discovery prevented by fraud. T h e Court stated:
" N o contention is made in the present case
u p o n the basis of fraud, either actual or constructive. Accordingly the general rule that limitations
begin to r u n from the time of breach, Zellan v.
Cole, 1950, 87 U.S. A p p . D . C 9, 183 F.2d 139,
applies. T h i s conforms with the purpose of statutes of limitation to b r i n g repose a n d to bar efforts
to enforce stale claims as to which evidence might
be lost or destroyed. See Bailey v. Glover, 1874,
21 W a l l . 342, 88 U.S. 342, 22 L.Ed. 636. In some
cases no d o u b t this rule leads to hardship, b u t the
rule for which plaintiff contends often w o u l d have
like consequences. W e must give effect to the
policy which bars litigation due to contract
breaches which occurred a longer time prior to
the institution of the litigation than the n u m b e r of
years of the applicable statute of limitations. Even
in the criminal law, absent specific provision to the
contrary, a statute of limitations begins to r u n from
the time of commission rather than of exposure of
the alleged offense. See Synnott v. Stale, 1927, 38
O k l . Cr. 2 8 1 , 260 P. 5 1 7 . "
I t w o u l d appear t h a t even if the limitation imposed
by this provision does not apply to the Plaintiffs in this
case, thus b r i n g i n g the four-year statute into play, the
terms and definitions with regard to actions of this kind
for injuries caused by defective design or construction of
i m p r o v e m e n t to real property are the statements of intention of the Legislature a n d would therefore still be
applicable. T h u s , even if Plaintiff wishes to remove himself from the seven-year limitation, he cannot change the
12

circumstances under which he brings this action nor remove himself from the Legislature's determination of
when the cause of action w o u l d accrue; namely, the completion of construction as defined in Section 78-12-25.5(2)
which would be controlling under Section 78-12-1 of the
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Appellants' actions are barred by Section 78-12-25(2)
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
POINT

III

S E C T I O N 78-12-25.5 O F T H E U T A H CODE
A N N O T A T E D IS A V A L I D A N D C O N S T I T U T I O N A L EXPRESSION O F T H E LEGISLAT I V E POLICY D E C I S I O N T H A T T H E R E
S H O U L D N O T BE L I A B I L I T Y FOR A N IND E F I N I T E P E R I O D I N A CASE OF ALLEGED
DEFECTIVE C O N S T R U C T I O N .
Such a determination is within the discretion of the
Legislature. It has been determined, in the case of this
statute, that if no cause of action arises within seven years
of the date of construction then that is prima facie evidence that there was no faulty construction.
Plaintiff asserts that this statute violates the Constitution because it may extinguish a cause of action before
that cause of action arises.
This is not a violation of due process or equal protection. T h e Constitution does not guarantee a right to
sue but only a right to due process and equal protection.
This statute does not violate those standards because it
is not discriminatory.

It applies evenly to all
13

injuries

which fall within its area of coverage. People who have
such injuries are not in any suspect classification, and they
are therefore not deprived of due process or equal protection.
Plaintiff relies upon Brown v. Wigbtman, 47 Utah
31, 151 P a c 366, (1915), to show that 78-12-25.5 is unconstitutional. Brown does not support Plaintiff's position but, rather, recognizes the legislative right to place
limitations on the right to be heard in court. It specifically
states that where the statute does not give a remedy the
Constitution does not require one.
"The right and power as well as the duty, of
creating rights and to provide remedies, lies with
the legislature and not with the courts. The courts
can only protect existing rights, and they may do
that only in accordance with established and known
remedies."
In many cases our statutes not only extinguish a cause
of action before the cause of action arises but they also
completely cut off the cause of action. For example, Workman's Compensation cases under Section 35-1-60 cut off
all civil liability of employers to employees under the
Workman's Compensation Statutes. See Masich v. United
States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., et aL, 113 Utah
101, 191 P.2d 612, (1948), where the Utah Supreme Court
held that the employee's right to sue was entirely abrogated by the statutory provisions.
Defendants urge the Court to take note of the United
States Supreme Court decision, Morey v. Doted, 354 U.S.
451, 1 L.Ed. 2d 1485, 77 Sup. Ct. 1344, (1957), where
14

Justices Frankfurter and H a r l a n , in dissent, caution against
the invalidation of legislation in the absence of extreme
circumstances. T h e y state:
" I n v a l i d a t i n g legislation is serious business
and it o u g h t not to be indulged in. . . . In applying the Equal Protection Clause, we must be fastidiously careful to observe the admonition of Mr.
Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone, and Mr. Justice
Cardozo that w e do not sit as a super legislature.
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 80 L.Ed. 299, 317,
56 S.Ct. 252, 102 ALR 54 (1935)."
This statute is a valid exercise of legislative discretion w i t h i n the constitutional limitations upon the legislative powers. It is not unconstitutional.
T h e U t a h Supreme Court has often held that the
legislative body has great discretion in fixing limits on
classification and also that it is not within the judiciary's
province to question the Legislature's wisdom or motives
in enactment of a statute. See: Davis v. Ogden

City,

117

Utah 315, 215 P.2d 616, (1950), 16 ALR 2d 1208, rehearing denied, 118*Utah 4 0 1 , 223 P.2d 412; Slater v. Salt
Lake City, 115 U t a h 476, 206 P.2d 153, (1949); Thomas
Daughters

of Utah Pioneers,

v.

114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477,

(1948), appeal denied 69 S. Ct. 739, 336 U.S. 950, 93 L.Ed.
1090; Rowley

v. Public

Service

Commission,

116, 185 P.2d 514, (1947); Bateman

112 Utah

v. Board of

Examin-

ers of State of Utah, 1 U t a h 2d 2 2 1 , 322 P.2d 381, (1958);
Broadbent

v. Gibson,

105 U t a h 53, 140 P.2d 939, (1943);

Rules of Civil Procedure,
Bradshaw

Rule 56, UCA 1953, 10-3-1; and

v. Beaver City, 27 U t a h 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643,

(1972).
15

POINT

IV

PLAINTIFFS ARE BARRED FROM BRINGING THIS ACTION BECAUSE IN FAILING
TO ALLEGE A DUTY OWED BY DEFENDANTS TO PLAINTIFFS THEY HAVE FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED.
In the pleadings now before this Court, Plaintiffs
have not made any allegation of any duty, contractual,
statutory or otherwise owed by Christensen and Hansen
to Plaintiffs Good. In the case of Industrial Commission
of Utah v. Wasatch Grading Co., 14 P.2d 988, 80 Utah
223, (1932), the Court held that the complaint was insufficient because it failed to disclose the essentials of
the alleged duty between the parties therein. In the instant case, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a duty owed by
Defendants to Plaintiffs and therefore they are barred
from bringing this action.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs are barred from bringing this action against
Defendants,
Respectfully submitted,
Dean E. Conder
NIELSEN, CONDER, HANSEN
AND HENRIOD
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents Don M. Christensen,
Don M. Christensen Construction
Co., and Construction Realty
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Guy Burningham
GUSTIN 8c GUSTIN
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents Lewis C. Hansen
and Billie ]. Hansen
1610 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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